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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a system approach for safety man-
agement of complex system. System engineering which
is an interdisciplinary ﬁeld of engineering that focuses
on how complex engineering projects should be designed
and managed is the framework of the approach. It allows
taking into account the safety requirements in system
engineering process to facilitates traceability of these
requirements throughout the life cycle of the system.
Processes of EIA-632 system standard are used to guide
the proposed approach.
Introduction
The system engineering process becomes more critical as
our systems increase in size and complexity. Important
system-level properties, such as safety and security (1),
must be built into the design of these systems from the
beginning; they cannot be added on or simply measured
afterward.
Systems are changed. These changes are stretching the
limits of current safety engineering approaches and tech-
niques. These changes are challenging both safety pro-
cesses, methods and tools. They concern:
∙ Fast pace of technological change
∙ Changing Nature of Accidents
∙ New types of hazards
∙ Increasing complexity and coupling
∙ Decreasing tolerance for single accidents
∙ More complex relationships between humans and
automation
∙ Changing regulatory and public views of safety
Rasmussen has argued that major accidents are often
caused not by a coincidence of independent failures but
instead reﬂect a systematic migration of organizational
behavior to the boundaries of safe behavior under pres-
sure toward cost-eﬀectiveness in an aggressive, compet-
itive environment (2).
Weaknesses of the current safety processes (ﬁgure 1) can
be resumed in the following points (non exhaustive list):
∙ Safety analysis involve some degree of intrinsic un-
certainty. So, there is a degree of subjectivity in
the identiﬁcation od safety issues.
∙ Diﬀerent groups need to work with diﬀerent views
of the system (e.g. systems engineers view, safety
engineers view). This is generally a beneﬁt but it
can be a weakness if the views are not consistent.
∙ Deﬁnition of the safety requirements and their for-
malization.
∙ Traceability of safety requirements.
∙ Existing / traditional safety analysis techniques are
diﬃcult to use on modern, complex systems.
∙ Textual description of failure modes is often too
ambiguous.
∙ System models are developed in electronic form,
but no use is made of this for Safety/ Reliability
analysis. Ideally there should be a common reposi-
tory of all requirements, design and safety informa-
tion.
Some points are due to the absence of a safety global
approach. Indeed, safety must be addressed as global
property and safety requirements (3) must be formu-
lated not only in the small but in the large.
For example, the Ariane 5 and Mars Polar Lander losses
are examples of system accidents. In both of these ac-
cidents, the components did not fail in terms of not
satisfying their speciﬁed requirements. The individual
components operated exactly the way the designers had
planned the problems arose in the unplanned or mis-
understood eﬀects of these component behaviors on the
Figure 1: Safety integration
system as a whole, that is, errors in the system design
rather than the component design, including errors in
allocating and tracing the system functions to the in-
dividual components. The solution, therefore, lies in
systems engineering. A global approach is so necessary.
Indeed, safety is clearly an emergent property of sys-
tems.
Some of these points are addressed by ESACS and
ISAAC projects. ESACS project (4) developed a
methodology and a platform that helps safety engineers
automating certain phases of their work.
The ESACS platform can be used as a tool to assist
the safety analysis process from the early phases of sys-
tem design to the formal veriﬁcation and safety assess-
ment phases. It gives a partial response for the weakness
cited above but it focused on the use of formal methods
for safety assessment and does not propose a global ap-
proach do achieve it. For example, traceability of safety
requirements and Human risk analysis are not consid-
ered.
ISSAC European project (5) which is the continuation
of ESACS project proposes to take into account human
errors analysis. It is achieved by injecting human errors
in the formal model.
Nevertheless, these two projects are essentially concen-
tred on formal method for safety assessment and not
really in a global approach to achieve it.
ASSERT is another project, but, like above projects
(ESACS and ISSAC), it focused on the method and tool.
Moreover, only software failures are considered.
The norme IEC 1508 (6), (7) consider the overall lifecy-
cle. It is considered as for the management of the safety
throughout the entire life of the system, but it concerns
only systems that require safety functions. It is guide
for the implementation of the relevant safety functions.
This work is part of a project in deploying System En-
gineering (SE)(11) (12) . We address the integration of
safety management in system engineering process. The
paper is structured into ﬁve remaining parts. The sec-
ond part gives a brief introduction of the emerging dis-
cipline of system engineering in matter of key processes
and the standard EIA-632 (13). The third part presents
brieﬂy the integration approach. In the forth part, an
original approach for safety integration in system engi-
neering process is proposed.
The system engineering framework for complex
system development
System Engineering is an interdisciplinary approach,
which provides concepts that make it possible to build
new applications. It is a collaborative and interdis-
ciplinary process of problems resolution, supporting
knowledge, methods and techniques resulting from the
sciences and experiment. system engineering is a frame-
work which helps to deﬁne the wanted system, which
satisﬁes identiﬁed needs and is acceptable for the envi-
ronment, while seeking to balance the overall economy
of the solution on all the aspects of the problem in all
the phases of the development and the life of the sys-
tem. SE concepts are adequate speciﬁcally for complex
problems; research issues undergone can bring a solution
(11).
System engineering concepts
System engineering is the application of scientiﬁc and
engineering eﬀorts in order to:
∙ Transform an operational need into a description of
system performance parameters and a system con-
ﬁguration through an iterative process of deﬁnition,
synthesis, analysis, design, test and evaluation.
∙ Integrate reliability, maintainability, availability,
safety, survivability, human engineering and other
factors into the overall engineering eﬀort to meet
cost, schedule, supportability and technical perfor-
mance objectives.
System engineering is an interdisciplinary approach
that:
1. Encompasses the scientiﬁc and engineering eﬀorts
related to development, manufacturing, veriﬁca-
tion, deployment, operations, support and disposal
of systems products and processes.
2. Develops needed user trainings, equipments, proce-
dures and data.
3. Establishes and maintains conﬁguration manage-
ment of the system.
4. Develops work breakdown structures and state-
ments of work and provides information for man-
agement decision-making.
System engineering is a management methodology to
assist designer through the formulation, analysis and in-
terpretation of the impacts of proposed policies, controls
or complete systems upon the need perspectives, institu-
tional perspectives and value perspectives of stakehold-
ers to issues under consideration.
System engineering is an appropriate combination of the
methods and tools of a suitable methodological process
and systems management procedures.
We distinguish three levels in System engineering as il-
lustrated in ﬁgure 2. The ﬁrst level, SE processes, fo-
cus on high-level issues, high-level requirements such as
business needs and strategic needs and methods.
The second level, System engineering methodologies and
methods, deals with all technical issues such as systems
requirements design methodologies standards.
The third level, System engineering tools or technolo-
gies, covers the implementation issues concerning the
tools to be used, the required technologies to respond
to the various assets of requirements such as reliability,
costs, maintainability and enabling technologies.
System engineering assists designer who desire to de-
velop policies for management, direction, control and
regulation activities relevant to forecasting, planning,
development, production and operation of total systems
Figure 2.
In System engineering best practice, we have the follow-
ing chain:
Processes → Methods → Tools
These entities, such as processes, methods and tools, are
the conceptual basis of our approach taken from System
engineering best practice. In the ﬁrst step, the processes
can be identiﬁed with respect to the accumulated know-
how, and can also be taken from a standard as the thir-
teen generic processes proposed in standard EIA-632.
The second step concerns the methods to be used. The
methods can be either developed or used by the existing
one, which implement the process as we cannot choose a
method for its ﬂexibility or popularity but only if it re-
ﬂects the semantics of the process. No taxonomy has yet
been developed for corresponding processes and meth-
ods. The third step concerns the tools that do not cor-
respond to the processes but the methods; hence in this
approach we cannot use a tool to implement a process
without ﬁrst identifying the associated methods.
 
Figure 2: Three levels of system engineering.
EIA-632 standard
One famous standard, currently used in the industrial
and military ﬁelds, is the EIA-632. This standard cov-
ers the product life cycle from the needs capture to
the transfer to the user. It gives a system engineering
methodology trough 13 interacting processes grouped
into 5 groups, covering the management issues, the sup-
ply/acquisition, design and requirement, realization and
veriﬁcation/validation processes. Figure 3 shows the in-
teraction between all the 5 groups of processes, whose
roles are (13):
1. Technical management processes (three processes):
these processes monitor the whole process ranging
from the initial idea of building a system until its
delivery.
2. Acquisition and supply processes (two processes):
these processes ensure the supply and acquisition
(and are very close to logistics).
3. System design processes (two processes): these pro-
cesses are on the elicitation and acquisition of re-
quirements and their modelling, the deﬁnition of
the solution and its design.
4. Product realization processes (two processes):
these processes deal with the implementation issues
of system design and its use.
5. Technical evaluation processes (four processes):
these processes deal with veriﬁcation, validation
and testing issues.
Brieﬂy, the operation of the proposed processes is:
∙ One acquisition request arrives and is treated by
the supply process by establishing an agreement,
∙ The acquirer requirements are then transmitted to
the System Design processes in charge of the elabo-
ration of the logical solution, then the physical one,
and also lots of sets of speciﬁed technical require-
ments, where each set is associated to a sub-system.
∙ The acquisition process is in charge to buy (if avail-
able in the market) or to make build the sub-
systems responding to the diﬀerent sets of speciﬁed
requirements.
∙ Once the sub-systems received, the realization of
the ﬁnal product can begin, based on the design
solution previously established and chosen.
∙ To ﬁnish, the ﬁnal system will be transferred to the
user, just after tests and ﬁnal validation.
In parallel, all the previous processes are managed, rated
and controlled by the technical management processes.
And the technical evaluation processes allows to do sys-
tem analysis (like risk analysis), requirement validations
or system veriﬁcation, during the development and when
needed.
In fact, one or several sub-processes are deﬁned for each
13 processes and the developer should decide which of
the all 33 sub-processes apply. In this paper, only the
system design processes and the technical evaluation
processes are considered. These processes appear as the
most important for safety management.

Figure 3: System engineering processes
Safety in system engineering process
Safety
Safety is an important system-level property, and must
be built into the design of these systems from the be-
ginning.
The safety assessment process can be decomposed into
three main phases:
∙ preparation phase which initiates the assessment
(Safety Target are deﬁned)
∙ conduct phase in which the assessment is performed
∙ conclusion phase in which the assessment results
are delivered.
System Engineering is the ideal framework for the design
of complex system. In this work It is considered as a
framework to manage safety.
A system engineering approach to safety starts with the
basic assumption that the safety propriety, can only be
treated adequately in their entirety, taking into account
all variables and relating the social to the technical as-
pects (9). This basis for system engineering has been
stated as the principle that a system is more than the
sum of its parts.
The Safety management must follow all steps of SE
From the requirements deﬁnition to the veriﬁcation and
the validation of the system. If we consider, for exam-
ple, a reliability requirement deﬁned for a global system,
its formalization and analysis must allow ensuring that
the technical solutions selected with design progression
deals with this reliability requirement at sub-systems
level and after their integration.
Note that this paper illustrates the proposed approach
in term of process which must be deﬁned independently
to methods and/or tools (other projects which are fo-
cused on the methods and tools (4) and (5) for exam-
ple). These diﬀerent works will be exploited in the safety
management from a global point of view.
Integration approach
The integration of safety must concern all system engi-
neering processes. This paper is focused only on:
∙ System Design processes,
∙ Technical Evaluation processes.
The safety requirements must be taken into account in
requirements deﬁnition process. It allows the formula-
tion, the deﬁnition, the formalization and the analysis
of these requirements. Then a traceability (10) model
must be build to ensure the taking into account of the
requirements throughout the development cycle of the
system.
These Safety requirements inﬂuence acquirer require-
ments, stakeholder requirements, system technical re-
quirements, logical solution representations and physical
solution representations.
Technical Evaluation processes deﬁne 12 types of sub-
processes going from requirement statements validation
to enabled product readiness. The sub-processes (The
task associated to each sub-process can be consulted in
(13)) considered are:
∙ requirements statements validation,
∙ acquirer requirements validation,
∙ other stakeholder requirements validation,
∙ system technical requirements validation,
∙ logical solution representations validation,
∙ design solution veriﬁcation.
The implementation of the approach consists in identi-
fying and indicating in which way the safety must be
considered for each sub-processes of EIA-632. In other
words, the sub-processes of EIA-632 standard are trans-
lated or reﬁned in terms of safety and included in system
design process.
EIA-632 sub-process to safety reﬁnement
In this section we address EIA-632 processes with safety
point of view.
System design processes
The System Design Processes are used to convert
agreed-upon requirements of the acquirer into a set of
realizable products that satisfy acquirer and other stake-
holder requirements.
Two processes are involved: the Requirements Deﬁni-
tion Process and the Solution Deﬁnition Process. The
relationship between these two processes is shown in Fig-
ure 4.
Figure 4: System design processes
Requirement deﬁnition process
The goal of the requirements deﬁnition process is to
transform the stakeholder (the acquirer and all other
stakeholders who have an interest in the system) require-
ments into a set of technical requirements. For func-
tional and no-functional requirements, if this distinc-
tion is not possible at the requirement elicitation pro-
cess level, the analyzer may do it to categorize require-
ments. To perform this task, 3 sub-processes are associ-
ated with this process: the Acquirer Requirements, the
Other Stakeholder Requirements and the System Tech-
nical Requirements sub-process. The Requirements Def-
inition Process is re-accomplished, if necessary.
a. Acquirer Requirements
The developer shall deﬁne a validated set of acquirer
requirements for the system, or portion thereof.
In the safety framework, acquirer requirements, gener-
ally, correspond to constraints in the system. It is nec-
essary to identify and collect all constraints imposed by
acquirer to obtain a dependable system. A hierarchical
organization associates weight to safety requirements,
following their criticality.
Some Standards are available to guide designer to de-
ﬁne safety requirements. For example, for safety critical
systems within the civil aerospace sector are developed
subject to the recommendations outlined in ARP4754
(14) and ARP4761 (15). These standards give guid-
ance on the ’determination’ of requirements, including
requirements capture, requirements types and derived
requirements.
When the requirements are deﬁned (16)some attributes
can be used to facilitate their management.
b. Other Stakeholder Requirements
The developer shall deﬁne a validated set of other stake-
holder requirements for the system, or portion thereof.
The same approach applied to acquirer requirements is
applied to Other Stakeholder Requirements.
c. System Technical Requirements
The developer shall deﬁne a validated set of system tech-
nical requirements from the validated sets of acquirer
requirements and other stakeholder requirements.
System technical requirements must be unambiguous,
complete, consistent, achievable, veriﬁable, and neces-
sary and suﬃcient for a system design.
For safety requirements, the system technical require-
ments traduce system performances. It consists on
deﬁning safety attributes (5. Determine risk tolerability,
MTBF, MTBR, failure rate for example).
Among all requirements formulated by the acquirer and
other stakeholder, some of them are safety requirements.
For example, critical events deﬁne reliability require-
ments in the sense that their taking into account must
leads to a design of a system able to avoid these events.
Solution Deﬁnition Process
The Solution Deﬁnition Process is used to generate an
acceptable design solution. This solution satisﬁes:
1. the system technical requirements resulting from
the Requirements Deﬁnition Process,
2. the derived technical requirements from the Solu-
tion Deﬁnition Process.
Three sub-processes are associated with the Solution
Deﬁnition Process.
a. Logical Solution Representations
The developer shall deﬁne one or more validated sets of
logical solution representations that conform with the
technical requirements of the system. In order to do
this, he must in particular (1) do some tradeoﬀ analy-
sis, (2) identify and deﬁne interfaces, states and modes,
timelines, and data and control ﬂows, (3) analyze be-
haviors, and (4) analyze failure modes and deﬁne failure
eﬀects.
Formal models can be used for logical solution repre-
sentations. The use of formal methods allows for au-
tomation of veriﬁcation and analysis and for a tighter
integration between system design and safety analysis.
The model can automatically enriched with failures in
order to perform safety analysis.
b. Physical Solution Representations
The developer shall deﬁne a preferred set of physical so-
lution representations that agrees with the assigned log-
ical solution representations, derived technical require-
ments, and system technical requirements.
The physical solution representations are derived from
logical solution representation and must respects all re-
quirements, particulary, safety requirements.
c. Speciﬁed Requirements
These requirements concern the design solution. The
designer must ensure that the design solution is consis-
tent with its source requirements. The safety analysis
process allows the validation of these requirements.
Technical Evaluation Processes
The Technical Evaluation Processes are intended to be
invoked by one of the other processes for engineering a
system. Four processes are involved: Systems Analysis,
Requirements Validation, System Veriﬁcation and End
Products Validation. The relationship between these
processes is shown in Figure 5.
In this paper, we focus only on 3 processes of the tech-
nical evaluation:
1. Systems Analysis Process, which contains a Risk
Analysis sub-process,
Figure 5: Technical evaluation processes.
2. Requirements Validation Process,
3. System Veriﬁcation Process.
Systems Analysis Process
The Systems Analysis Process is used to:
1. Provide a rigorous basis for technical decision mak-
ing, resolution of requirement conﬂicts, and assess-
ment of alternative physical solutions;
2. Determine progress in satisfying system technical
and derived technical requirements;
3. Support risk management;
4. Ensure that decisions are made only after evaluat-
ing cost, schedule, performance, and risk eﬀects on
the engineering or reengineering of the system.
a. Risk Analysis sub-process
The developer shall perform risk analysis to develop risk
management strategies, support management of risks
and support decision making.
Several techniques can be used to analyze risks, for ex-
ample: fault tree, or Failure Mode, Eﬀect, and Criti-
cality Analysis. This step is very important, because it
determines the risks of the system.
The step of risk analysis can generate safety require-
ments other than that deﬁned by the acquirer and stake-
holder. These new requirements must be taken into ac-
count.
Requirements Validation Process
Requirements Validation is critical to successful system
product development and implementation. Require-
ments are validated when it is certain that they de-
scribe the input requirements and objectives such that
the resulting system products can satisfy them. The
Requirements Validation Process helps to ensure that
the requirements are necessary and suﬃcient for creat-
ing design solutions appropriate to meet the exit criteria
of the applicable engineering life cycle phase and of the
enterprise-based life cycle phase in which the engineer-
ing or reengineering eﬀorts occur. In this process, a
great attention is done to traceability analysis, which
allows verifying all the links among Acquirer and Other
Stakeholder Requirements, Technical and Derived Tech-
nical Requirements, and Logical Solution Representa-
tions.
Like other requirements, safety requirements must be
validated. The validation allows to design safe system.
to facilitate this step, semi-formal solutions, like UML
(17) or SysML (18) (which is an UML proﬁle for sys-
tems engineering), can be used for good formulation of
requirements. Indeed the diversity of people concerned
by the system design project can have limited knowl-
edge concerning the structure of a future system makes
industry-scale requirement engineering projects so hard.
So the UML or SysML with their diﬀerent diagrams can
be helpful.
System Veriﬁcation Process
The System Veriﬁcation Process is used to ascertain
that:
1. The generated system design solution is consistent
with its source requirements.
2. End products meet their speciﬁed requirements at
each level of the system structure implementation
(from the bottom up).
3. Enabling product development or procurement for
each associated process is properly progressing.
4. Required enabling products will be ready and avail-
able when needed to perform.
Simulation is a good and current method used to achieve
system veriﬁcation. Other methods like virtual proto-
typing, model checking and other ones can be used.
Conclusion
The approach presented in this paper concerns safety in-
tegration in system engineering process. It allows to give
some guidelines to address eﬃciently safety of complex
systems in all phase of system design. The approach
is based on EIA-632 standard and can be resumed as
follows:
∙ Elements of the approach: process → methods →
tools
∙ System engineering processes handled using EIA-
632 standard
∙ Integration of safety analysis in system engineering
process
The paper addresses some processes of the standard
EIA-632 independently to methods and/or tools. The
processes addressed are system design process and tech-
nical evaluation process.
The work is in progress and other processes will be used
and deﬁned in the integration approach. The next step
of the deploying system engineering project is to propose
appropriate methods and tools for achieving each sub-
processes of the EIA-632 standard.
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